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1 Introduction
The growing field of Behavioral Economics has frequently identified differences between the
canonical model of rational decision making and actual human behavior. These differences,
usually referred to as “anomalies” or “biases,” have been identified through controlled ex-
periments in the laboratory, as well as in field experiments (see, e.g., Kagel & Roth, 1997;
Harrison & List, 2004). Though some researchers have challenged the existence of some of
these biases, others appear to be robust with a wide variety of evidence on behavior that
departs from payoff maximization. Such behavior is puzzling to economists, who are trained
to think that competitive forces in our society and economy select optimal over suboptimal
behavior.
In this paper, we argue that sets of biases may persist because they jointly compensate
for the errors that any one of them would give rise to in isolation. Thus, biases may coevolve
as a “shortcut” solution that leads in specific important environments to behavior that is
approximately optimal.1 In circumstances that have less influence on the agents’ expected
payoffs (e.g., circumstances of infrequent occurrence), agents may be subject to substantial
behavioral “mistakes.” The vast majority of the existing literature studies behavioral biases
separately (see related literature at the end of this section). The results in this paper suggest
that we can gain a better understanding of different behavioral biases by analyzing their
combined effects.
We specifically investigate a possible relation between the endowment effect and the
winner’s curse, though our framework and insights are also relevant to the study of relations
between other biases. The endowment effect (Thaler, 1980) refers to an individual’s tendency
to place a higher value on a good once he owns it. In a seminal paper, Kahneman et al.
(1990) distributed coffee mugs to half of the students in a classroom. When asked to assess
the value of the mug, the mug-owners had on average a much higher valuation than the rest
of the students.2 The winner’s curse or cursedness (Eyster & Rabin, 2005) is the failure of
an agent to account for the informational content of other players’ actions. The bias was
1Cesarini et al. , 2012 present experimental evidence suggesting that many common behavioral biases
(and in particular, loss aversion, which is closely related to the endowment effect) are moderately heritable:
genetic variation typically accounts for 20%–30% of the variance in the surveyed anomalies. Moreover,
they conjecture that if the experimental methods were adapted to better filter out noise, then the genetic
variation would account for about half of the variance (similar to the typical finding of the literature studying
the heritability of the the “big five” personality traits, see, e.g., Jang et al. , 1996). In Section 6.1 we discuss
why our results also hold for partially heritable biases.
2See Kahneman et al. (1991) for a survey on the endowment effect, and see Knetsch et al. (2001);
Genesove & Mayer (2001); Bokhari & Geltner (2011); Apicella et al. (2013) for recent experimental and field
evidence.
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first identified in common-value auctions in which the winners, who usually have the highest
signal, tend to overestimate the value of the object. A similar phenomenon was later observed
in bilateral-trade interactions, of the kind discussed in this paper (Bazerman & Samuelson,
1983; Kagel & Levin, 1986; Kagel et al. , 1987; Lind & Plott, 1991).3
Model and Results. We demonstrate that these two seemingly unrelated biases com-
pensate for each other in barter-trade interactions such as were common among prehistoric
societies.4 In our model, each of two traders owns a different kind of indivisible good and
considers whether to participate in trade or not. The expected value of each good depends
on an unobservable property that is known to the owner of the good but not to his trad-
ing partner. The potential gain of the traders also depends on additional conditions (initial
stock, location, weather, etc.), which are known to both players before they engage in trading
but can change from one instance of trade to another. Goods are exchanged if both traders
agree.
Each agent in the population is endowed with a pair of biases. The level of these biases
determines his type, and the agent with the minimal level of both biases (i.e., the unbiased
one) is “rational.” The first bias is cursedness: the extent to which an agent underestimates
the relation between the partner’s agreement to trade and the quality of this partner’s good.
In the trade game, agents in general choose to trade goods that are not very valuable and
keep valuable goods for themselves. A cursed trader does not pay enough attention to this
fact and overestimates the value of his partner’s good conditional on trade (in the extreme
case, a fully cursed agent simply expects to get a good of ex-ante value). As a result, a more
cursed agent will agree to trade goods with a greater personal value. Thus, cursedness leads
agents to trade too much, and higher cursedness results in more trade.
The second bias is a perception bias: a function (ψ) that distorts an agent’s subjective
valuation of his own good. If the good is worth x, an agent believes it to be worth ψ (x).
If ψ (x) > x, we say that the agent exhibits the endowment effect, but we allow agents to
have also other perception biases as well. An agent with the endowment effect does not agree
to trade goods with low values since he believes those goods to be more valuable than they
actually are, and thus he loses profitable transactions.5 Agents with the endowment effect
3See Kagel & Levin (2002, Chapter 1) for a survey on the winner’s curse, and see Grosskopf et al. (2007);
Massey & Thaler (2013) for recent experimental support and field evidence.
4Evidence from anthropology suggests that trade between groups, based on localization of natural re-
sources and tribal specializations, was common in primitive societies (see Herskovits, 1952; Polanyi, 1957;
Sahlins, 1972; Haviland et al. , 2007). Moreover, “[t]he literature on trade in nonliterate societies makes clear
that barter is by far the most prevalent mode of exchange” (Herskovits, 1952, p. 188).
5The fact that traders may have an endowment effect seems at first sight at odds with experiments that
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trade too little, and traders with a higher level of endowment effect trade less.
We analyze the interaction among a large population of traders with different types (i.e.,
different levels of biases). Agents are randomly matched and play the barter game. We
assume that agents do not observe the types of their partners and in each period they best-
reply to an “average” trader. Their best reply, however, is distorted by their own biases. We
show that there is a set Γ of types that exhibit both the winner’s curse and the endowment
effect, such that the two biases compensate each other. The set Γ includes not only the
rational unbiased type, but also types of all levels of cursedness, and types who are more
cursed present a greater endowment effect.
Our first result (Proposition 1) shows that a distribution of types is a Nash equilibrium
of the population game if and only if its support is a subset of Γ. Moreover, all agents in the
population present the same “as-if-rational” behavior on the equilibrium path (their trading
strategy is identical to that of a rational trader), and any type outside Γ achieves a strictly
lower payoff if it invades the population. In a dynamic setting where the payoff of the barter
game determine the agents’ fitness and the frequency of the types evolves according to a
payoff-monotone selection (e.g., the replicator dynamic; see Taylor & Jonker, 1978), stable
distributions of types are exactly those with a support in Γ.
We then extend our analysis to the case where fitness is determined not only by the
outcome of barter trade, but is also a result of other activities, in which the biases typically
do not compensate for each other. We assume that while agents interact most of the time
in barter trade, with some probability they play other games in which biases lead to strictly
lower payoffs.6 Under the assumption that the unbiased type has a strict advantage,7 we
show (Proposition 2) that in such a case the sole survivor under the standard replicator
have shown that professionals not to have an endowment effect for goods obtained solely for trade rather than
personal consumption (e.g., Kahneman et al. , 1990 and List, 2003, 2004). For example, a shoemaker will not
have an endowment effect for the shoes he makes. This may be related to the fact that either the shoemaker
does not have much value for the goods unless he can sell them or does not see them as his “endowment” in
the first place because they are made for sale. However, manufacturing goods solely for trade is a feature of
the modern world. Though tribes did specialize in specific goods for trade, traded goods were also consumed
by other tribe members (Herskovits, 1952). Thus, there is no contradiction between the assumption that
tribe members developed the endowment effect for their goods in primitive times and the empirical evidence
that professional traders exhibit less of an endowment effect for traded goods.
6In section 6.2 we discuss how to adapt our results to a setup in which players interact each time in slightly
different barter trade interactions.
7The assumption may be too extreme as in some setups each bias may have additional benefits. When
biases are at least partially observable, the endowment effect can be beneficial by inducing credible tough-
ness in bargaining (Heifetz & Segev, 2004; Huck et al. , 2005). The winner’s curse can reduce the risk of
creating information cascades (Bernardo & Welch, 2001, show how an evolutionary process can induce agents
to underestimate information that is revealed by the actions of others). In addition, developing fully ratio-
nal thinking may incur “complexity costs”, which are abstracted away in the model. See also Compte &
Postlewaite (2004); Robson & Samuelson (2009) for other examples of the benefits of biases.
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dynamic is the rational type.
We then show that under a wide collection of plausible selection dynamics, the above
result is no longer true and types with both biases are stable. The replicator dynamic is
based on two assumptions: (1) any newborn agent in a population replicates the type of an
incumbent agent, and (2) the choice of which incumbent to replicate is proportional to the
game payoffs of the incumbent types. We present the family of hybrid-replicator dynamics
that relaxes the first assumption. Specifically, we assume that each new agent inherits with
some probability each bias from a different incumbent, and with the remaining probability
inherits both biases from a single incumbent. One plausible interpretation of hybrid-replicator
dynamics is a biological evolutionary process where each offspring’s genotype is a mixture of
his parents’ genes. Another interpretation is social learning in which some agents may learn
different strategic aspects from different “mentors.”
The hybrid-replicator dynamic is not payoff-monotone because only a fraction of the
agent’s offspring share his type, while the other offspring have “hybrid” types. Consider for
example a population composed of a single type in Γ, that is, a type where the two biases
compensate for each other. Now assume that this population is invaded by a small group
of “mutant” rational agents. Such agents, by definition, have a higher fitness due to their
advantage in non-barter activities. However, only a fraction of the rational agent’s offspring
are rational and this “dilutes” their relative fitness advantage. The remaining hybrid offspring
(which have only one bias) have low fitness, because their single bias is not compensated by
the other bias in the barter interaction. As a result, the biased incumbent is stable against
unbiased mutants.
We formalize this observation and obtain two key results. Proposition 3 shows a global
convergence towards Γ; that is, any type outside Γ can be eliminated by a mutant with the
same cursedness level and a perception bias that is strictly closer to Γ.8 The second result
(Proposition 4) shows that each type in Γ is stable against each “mutant” type t′ if the barter
interaction is sufficiently frequent. We interpret these results as follows. First, the population
converges relatively quickly from any initial state towards a type close to Γ. The particular
type depends on the initial state and it is generally a biased type. Once the population is
near Γ, it remains for a long time in each state, and it slowly drifts between types near Γ
such that each type is close to its precedent but has a slightly lower level of biases (giving
it an advantage in non-barter activities). This drift is extremely slow, as only mutants that
8In Section 5.2 we justify the focus of our analysis on the stability of types rather than heterogeneous
populations. We do it by sketching why, due to the concavity of the payoffs, heterogeneous populations are
unstable.
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are “close” to the incumbent types can invade. We would therefore expect the population
to be composed of agents with both cursedness and the endowment effect for a long period
of time. Only in the “ultra-long” run will the population eventually reach the rational type.
Previous studies have also discussed stability in shorter horizons than the “ultra-long” run,
and suggest that biological populations can be found in locally optimal states that are not
stable in the “ultra-long” run (see, e.g., Hammerstein, 1996).9 This seems plausible also in
processes of social learning.
Related Literature and Contribution. Our paper is related to the “indirect evolution-
ary approach” literature (Guth & Yaari, 1992), dealing with the evolution of preferences
that deviate from payoff (or fitness) maximization. A main stylized result in this literature
(see Ok & Vega-Redondo, 2001; Dekel et al. , 2007) is that biases can be stable only if
types are observable, so a player can condition his behavior on an opponent’s type.10 We
show, in contrast, that even with the “conventional” replicator dynamic, stable states may
contain biased players who play as if they were rational on the equilibrium path (however,
off the equilibrium path their “mistakes” can be observed).11 Moreover, when considering
hybrid-replicator dynamics, players can also play suboptimally on the equilibrium path.12
Our paper is also related to the literature that explains how behavioral biases may evolve.
A majority of these papers deal with a single bias.13 Few papers have dealt with the possibility
that evolution will create two biases that are significantly different and yet complementary.
Heifetz et al. (2007a,b) develop a general framework in which natural selection may lead to
perception biases, and show that if preferences are observable, then, generically, non-material
preferences will be stable. In a non-evolutionary context, Kahneman & Lovallo (1993) suggest
that two biases, excessive risk aversion and the tendency of individuals to consider decision
problems one at a time, partially cancel each other out. Recently, Ely (2011) demonstrated
9One famous example of this in the human population is Sickle cell disease. The disease occurs when
a person has two mutated alleles and it severely reduces fitness. This genetic disease is relatively frequent,
especially in areas in which malaria is common, due to the heterozygote advantage: a person with a single
mutated allele has a better resistance to malaria.
10A related example is Huck et al. (2005) and Heifetz & Segev (2004) who show that an endowment effect
observed by others can evolve in populations that engage in bargaining, through its use as a “commitment”
device. See also Heller (2013b) that shows a related result for limited foresight.
11See a related result in Sandholm (2001) in a setup of preference evolution.
12The literature contains two other mechanisms that allow players not to maximize their material payoffs
in stable states even without assuming observability of types: (1) finite population (Schaffer, 1988), and (2)
assortative matching of players (Alger & Weibull, 2013).
13Samuelson (2004) and Nöldeke & Samuelson (2005) deal with relative consumption effects; Robson &
Samuelson (2007, 2009) and Dasgupta & Maskin (2005) show how “present bias” (dynamic inconsistency)
might have evolved; Heller (2013a) shows that overconfidence may emerge as a tool for risk diversification.
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that in evolutionary processes improvements tend to come in the form of “kludges,” that
is, marginal adaptations that compensate for, but do not eliminate, fundamental design
inefficiencies. Finally, Herold & Netzer (2011) show that, different biases that are postulated
in prospect theory partially compensate for each other, and Johnson & Fowler (2011) show
that overconfidence arise naturally in a setup where agents are not fitness-maximizing and
use a non-Bayesian decision making heuristic.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature that studies the influence of sexual inheri-
tance on stable properties of populations.14 Various papers in the biological literature study
the differences between the induced stable behavior in asexual populations (analogous to
the standard replicator dynamic) and sexual populations (analogous to the hybrid-replicator
dynamic), and the implications of these differences on the stability of sexual inheritance (see,
e.g., Maynard Smith, 1971; Barton & Charlesworth, 1998). The methodology of studying
stable outcomes in sexual populations in which two traits co-evolve was developed in Karlin
(1975) and extended, among others, in Eshel & Feldman (1984) and Matessi & Di Pasquale
(1996). A few papers in the economic literature applied this methodology. Waldman (1994)
shows that sexual inheritance can yield stable “second-best” adaptations in which agents
have systematic errors, and demonstrates how this can induce overconfidence. Bergstrom &
Bergstrom (1999) study the influence of sexual inheritance on parent-offspring conflicts in
which the parent and the offspring do not agree about how resources should be allocated
among family members. They show that, in contrast to the asexual case, offspring may
successfully “blackmail” their parents into providing additional resources.
The main contribution of our paper with respect to this literature is threefold. First,
we show how this approach can explain the joint stability of two widespread and estab-
lished biases that are seemingly unrelated to each other. Second, we introduce the new
family of “hybrid-replicator” dynamics that captures the important dynamical aspects of the
co-evolution of several traits when each agent has more than one parent/mentor, while ab-
stracting away the complex technicalities of the existing related models that analyze diploid
sexual populations (in which each individual has two copies of each chromosome: see, e.g.,
Eshel & Feldman, 1984. We believe that this family of dynamics will be useful in future
research of biological and cultural evolutionary processes. Third, we extend the related anal-
14Sexual inheritance induces a probability of “mixing” genes, known as the “recombination rate,” which is
captured in the family of hybrid-replicator dynamics by the probability of obtaining each trait from a different
incumbent. The recombination rate is equal to 0.5 if each trait is influenced by a different chromosome (in
which case each offspring has probability 0.5 of inheriting both traits from the same parent), and is strictly
between 0.5 and 1 if both genes are located in the same chromosome; for an introductory analysis, see Hartl
et al. (1997).
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ysis of Waldman (1994), who deals only with local stability and an exogenously fixed finite
set of feasible types, to analyze also global convergence and an unrestricted continuous set
of feasible types.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model of a population of agents
engaging in barter trade. A classic dynamic analysis is performed in Section 3 where we
show that all types in Γ are stable. In Section 4 we introduce additional non-barter activities
and show that only the unbiased type remains stable in the replicator dynamic. Section 5
presents the family of the hybrid-replicator dynamics and shows that under these dynamics
the biased types in Γ are stable. We conclude with a discussion of additional issues related
to the model in Section 6. All proofs appear in the Appendix.
2 Model
We present a model of barter trade, common and important in prehistoric societies, in which
a population consists of a continuum of agents (or traders) that are randomly matched
to engage in a trading interaction. Each agent in the population is endowed with a type
that determines his biases. Agents do not observe the types of their trading partners. We
describe below the different components of the interaction between each pair of traders in
the population and then move on to describe the population game that is induced by these
trade interactions.
2.1 Barter Interaction
A barter interaction is composed of two agents matched as trading partners. Each agent
i ∈ {1, 2} in the pair owns a different kind of indivisible good, and obtains a private signal
xi regarding the value of his own good. We assume x1,x2 are continuous, independent, and
identically distributed with full support over [L,H], where 0 < L < H. Let µ ≡ E (xi) be
the (ex-ante) expected value of xi and let µ≤y ≡ E (xi|xi ≤ y) be the expected value of xi
given that its value is at most y.
Both traders receive a public signal α ≥ 1, which is a “surplus coefficient” of trade: the
good owned by agent −i is worth α ·x−i to agent i.15 High α represents better conditions for
trade independently of the quality of the goods. For example, if both parties have a great
15Our results remain qualitatively unchanged in the case where each agent i privately obtains an indepen-
dent identically distributed surplus coefficient αi. The results would be similar if we had an interdependent
values setup and not a common values setup, i.e., if the the good of agent −i were of worth αx−i + vi to
agent i, where vi is some constant or random variable.
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need for the commodity they do not own, then α will be high. Given that α denotes trade
conditions other than quality, which is represented by x1 and x2, we assume that α, x1, and
x2 are all independent. The coefficient α can have any continuous distribution with support[
1, H
L
]
.16 The agents interact by simultaneously declaring whether they are willing to trade.
The goods are exchanged if and only if both agents agree to trade.
2.2 Biases / Types
Each agent has a pair of biases, and their specific levels are denoted by its type, (χ, ψ). The
first bias is cursedness à la Eyster & Rabin (2005). A trader of type χ ∈ [0, 1] best-replies to a
biased belief17 that the expected value of his partner’s good is α ·(χ · µ+ (1− χ) · µα), where
µα is the expected value of his partner’s good when the partner agrees to trade and the trade
coefficient is α. Thus, a cursed trader only partially takes into account the informational
content of the other trader’s action (a rational agent has χ = 0; a “fully cursed” trader with
χ = 1 believes he always gets an “average” object). Notice that if µα < µ (as we show below),
then a χ-cursed trader with χ > 0 overestimates the quality of his partner’s good.
The second component, ψ, is a trader’s perception bias regarding his own good. We
assume that ψ ∈ Ψ, where Ψ is the set of continuous and strictly increasing functions from
[L,H] to itself. A trader with perception bias ψ best-replies to a biased belief that his own
good’s value is ψ (x) (rather than x). If ψ (x) > x for all x 6= H we say that the trader
exhibits an endowment effect. Given two perception biases, ψ1 and ψ2, we say that ψ1 is
more biased than ψ2, denoted by ψ1  ψ2, if for all x ∈ [L,H] either ψ1 (x) ≤ ψ2 (x) ≤ x
or ψ1 (x) ≥ ψ2 (x) ≥ x. We write ψ1  ψ2 if ψ1  ψ2 and ψ2 6 ψ1. Letting I ∈ Ψ denote
the identity function, I (x) ≡ x, type (0, I) is the unbiased, or the “rational” type. Denote
T = [0, 1]×Ψ the set of all types.
2.3 Strategies and Configurations
A general strategy for trader i is a function from α to values of xi for which the trader agrees
to trade. If an agent expects a positive surplus from trading an object of value xi, then he
16Full support over
[
1, HL
]
is needed for uniqueness. Specifically, it implies that for each fixed cursedness
level, any two different perception biases induce different threshold strategies. Without this property our
results would not change qualitatively: the equilibrium we define below would include more types, but the
observed behavior of these types would be the same. Finally, the results are similar in the cases where we:
(1) allow for smaller or greater α’s, or (2) assume full support only over
[
1, Hµ
]
; however, this makes the
notation cumbersome.
17The formal definition of best-replying to biased beliefs is formalized below.
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expects a positive surplus also from trading objects with a value less than xi. Thus, we can
restrict our attention to threshold strategies. An agent’s pure threshold strategy (or simply,
strategy) is a continuous function s :
[
1, H
L
]
→ R+ that determines, for each α, the maximal
value of x for which the agent accepts trade.18 That is, an agent who follows strategy s
accepts trade if and only if x ≤ s (α).19 Note that xi is continuous and so there is always a
unique best response (see Equation. 1 below), hence the focus on pure strategies is without
loss of generality. Since the actual value of the trader’s good belongs to the interval [L,H],
we interpret thresholds s(α) < L and s(α) > H as strategies where the trader never agrees
to trade and always agrees to trade, respectively. Let S denote the set of strategies.
In what follows we assume that the number of types in the population is finite. Specifically,
let ∆ (T ) be the set of type distributions with finite support (we slightly abuse notation and
denote by t degenerate distributions with a single type t). A state of the population, or
configuration, is formally defined as follows:
Definition 1. A configuration is a pair (η, b), where η ∈ ∆ (T ) is a distribution of types and
b : supp (η)→ S is a behavior function assigning a strategy to each type.
Observe that the definition implies that an agent does not observe his opponent’s type. He
best-replies while taking into account the value of a random traded good, which is determined
jointly by the distribution of types (biases) in the population and the strategy that each type
uses in the game. Given a configuration (η, b), let µα (η, b) be the mean value of a good of
a random trader, conditional on the trader’s agreement to trade when the trade coefficient
is α (formally defined in (5)). Notice that this mean value is determined jointly by the
distribution of types (biases) in the population and the strategy each type employs in the
game. Let s∗t (α) (η, b) denote the best-reply threshold of a trader of type t = (χ, ψ) who
is facing a surplus coefficient α and configuration (η, b). Formally, s∗t (α) (η, b) is the unique
value in [L,H] that solves the equation
ψ (s∗t (α) (η, b)) = α · (χ · µ+ (1− χ) · µα (η, b)) . (1)
The interpretation of (1) is as follows. The RHS describes the value of the good a trader
expects to receive from a trade, given his cursedness level χ. The LHS describes the value the
trader attaches to a good of value s∗t (α) (η, b), given his perception bias ψ. A trader strictly
18The mild assumption that the strategies are continuous with respect to α is necessary to achieve unique-
ness of equilibria in the population game (i.e., the support of any Nash equilibrium is a subset of Γ). Without
this continuity there may be a gap of values of x that does not influence agents’ decisions, and allow other
ψs that differ only over these x’s to be part of an equilibrium.
19The results are unaffected if one assumes that traders reject trade if their signal is equal to their threshold.
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prefers to trade (respectively, not to trade) if his good’s perceived value is less (respectively,
greater) than the expected value of another trader’s good, conditional on an agreement to
trade. The unique threshold for which the trader is indifferent between trading and not
trading is s∗t (α) (η, b).
We conclude this section by explicitly mentioning the influence of biases on types’ strate-
gies (Equation 1):
Remark 1 (Effect of biases on trading behavior).
1. A cursed trader (χ > 0) overestimates the good of his partner and therefore uses a
threshold that is too high (note that since we deal with threshold strategies, goods
with the highest qualities are not traded, and µα ≤ µ). That is, cursed traders trade
too much.
2. A trader with an endowment effect (ψ(x) > x) overestimates the quality of his own good
and therefore uses a threshold that is too low. That is, traders with the endowment
effect trade too little.
2.4 Equilibrium Configurations and the Population Game
A configuration is an equilibrium if each type best-replies in the manner presented above.
Definition 2 (Equilibrium Configuration). A configuration (η, b) is an equilibrium if for each
type t = (χ, ψ) ∈ supp (η) and for every α ∈
[
1, H
L
]
, b(t)(α) = s∗t (α) (η, b).
Our first result shows that for every distribution of types there exists an equilibrium
configuration. Formally:
Lemma 1 (Existence of Equilibrium Configurations). For every distribution of types η ∈
∆ (T ) , there exists a behavior b such that (η, b) is an equilibrium configuration.
There may be more than one equilibrium configuration with the same underlying dis-
tribution. In what follows, we assume that for any distribution, one specific equilibrium is
always played. Formally, assume an arbitrary function b∗ that assigns to each type distribu-
tion η ∈ ∆ (T ) a behavior such that
(
η, b∗η
)
is an equilibrium configuration. One example of
b∗ is a function that chooses the equilibrium with maximal trade, but any function will do.
Since we assume that for each distribution η a specific equilibrium is played, in what follows
we can focus solely on the distribution of types η.
11
The barter-trade interaction together with the equilibrium selection function b∗ define
a population game G0 = (T, u), where T is the set of types (as defined above), and u :
T×∆ (T )→ [L,H] is the payoff function that describes the expected value of a good obtained
by a type t agent that best-replies to a trade with a random partner from configuration
(
η, b∗η
)
;
a formal definition of u(t, η) appears in Appendix A.2.20
3 Compensation of Biases in Barter Trade
In this section we analyze the population game that arises when there are repeated inter-
actions of the barter trade. We assume there is a large population of anonymous agents of
various types. Agents are randomly matched each period and play the trade game. Agents’
payoffs from trade determine their fitness and therefore their frequency in the population in
the next stage; that is, we assume that type’s frequencies evolve through a payoff-monotone
selection dynamic, such as the replicator dynamic (Taylor & Jonker, 1978). We restrict our-
selves in this section to a static analysis of equilibria in such a game. Our main result is
that the only stable populations are those where the endowment effect and winner’s curse
compensate each other and create an as-if rational behavior on the equilibrium path. Thus,
behavioral biases survive natural selection together.
3.1 Rational and As-If Rational Behavior
As a first step to characterizing the equilibrium of G0, consider the case where the entire
population is unbiased; that is, the threshold of each agent is determined by the indifference
condition
x∗(α) ≡ s∗(I,0) (α) = α · µα,
which is derived by substituting ψ(x) = x and χ = 0 into (1). It is easy to show that
if all agents play homogeneously in such a way, then in a Nash equilibrium the “rational”
threshold, denoted by x∗, must be a solution to the equation
x∗(α) = α · µ<x∗(α).
20Our notion of population game implicitly assumes a two-layer evolutionary process (as is common in
the literature; see, e.g., Dekel et al. , 2007): a relatively slower process according to which the distribution
of types evolves, and a faster process according to which agents learn to “subjectively” best-reply to the
aggregate behavior in the population. We make this assumption for reasons of tractability and consistency
with the existing literature. However, all our results can also be adapted to a setup in which the evolution of
types is not much slower than the evolution of behavior (and agents subjectively best-reply to the aggregate
behavior of the population in the recent past).
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Next, for each χ ∈ [0, 1] associate the perception bias ψ∗χ ∈ Ψ defined by
ψ∗χ (x) ≡ χ ·
µ
µ≤x
· x+ (1− χ) · x. (2)
Now, let Γ =
{(
χ, ψ∗χ
)
: χ ∈ [0, 1]
}
⊂ T be the set of all such types. Observe that:
1. ψ∗0 (x) ≡ I. Thus the unbiased type (0, I) is in Γ.
2. All other types in Γ are cursed (χ > 0) and exhibit the endowment effect (ψ∗χ (x) > x
for all x < H).
3. Types in Γ who are more cursed also have a larger endowment effect: χ1 > χ2 implies
that ψ∗χ1  ψ∗χ2 .
A graphic representation of Γ appears in Figure 1. Assume again that the population behaves
Figure 1: An example of Γ. For every level of cursedness χ there is a perception bias function
ψ∗χ(x). The net bias ψ∗χ(x)−x is plotted as a line on the X-Z plane. As can be seen, each bias
function ψ∗χ presents the endowment effect, and therefore all values are positive. Moreover,
high cursedness (χ closer to one) is associated with a greater endowment effect (steeper slope
for the function and higher values). This figure was calculated assuming L = 1, H = 2, and
a uniform distribution of values.
according to the “rational Nash equilibrium” described above, and therefore µα = µ<x∗(α).
Then, the threshold chosen by each type in Γ is (equation (1))
13
χ · µ
µ≤s∗t (α)
· s∗t (α) + (1− χ) · s∗t (α) = α · (χ · µ+ (1− χ) · µα) ,
or
s∗t (α) = α · µ<x∗(α) = x∗(α).
That is, when all other agents in the population behave “rationally,” the behavior of types in Γ
is indistinguishable from the rational type. The endowment effect and cursedness compensate
for each other, and the
(
χ, ψ∗χ
)
agent behaves (on the equilibrium path) as if he is unbiased.
3.2 Equilibrium and Stability
We now formalize the ideas that were presented informally above. First, let us define a Nash
equilibrium of the population game. A distribution of types is a Nash equilibrium if it is a
best reply to itself. Formally:
Definition 3 (Nash Equilibrium). Distribution η ∈ ∆ (T ) is a Nash equilibrium in game
G0 = (T, u) if u (t, η) ≥ u (t′, η) for all t ∈ supp (η) and t′ ∈ T . When the inequality is strict,
we say that the distribution is a strict equilibrium.
The following definition assures that a set of types has two properties: (1) all types have
the same payoff (internal-equivalence) and it is therefore internally stable; (2) the set is
immune to an invasion of a small number of “mutant” types, since those types underperform
types in the set (external strictness).
Definition 4. A set of types Y ⊆ T is internally equivalent and externally strict in game
G0 = (T, u) if u (t, η) = u (t′, η) > up
(
tˆ, η
)
for all η ∈ ∆ (Y ), t, t′ ∈ Y and tˆ ∈ T\Y .
Using these definitions, we can explicitly formulate our first main result:
Proposition 1 (Characterization of Equilibria in G0). A distribution η ∈ ∆ (T ) is a Nash
equilibrium of G0 if and only if supp (η) ⊆ Γ. Moreover, Γ is an internally equivalent and
externally strict set.
Given Proposition 1, we can rely on existing results to relate the static equilibria with
dynamically stable distributions in payoff-monotone dynamics like the replicator dynamic
(Taylor & Jonker, 1978). We sketch below the argument why the set Γ is dynamically stable,
and types outside Γ are unstable.
A distribution of types η is Lyapunov stable if after any sufficiently small invasion of
a mutant distribution of types, the population composition remains close to η at all future
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generations.21A set of Lyapunov-stable distributions is asymptotically stable if, after any small
enough invasion of a mutant distribution to any of the distributions in the set, the population
reverts back to the set in the long run. An asymptotically stable set is minimal if no strict
subset is asymptotically stable. For brevity we omit the formal definitions and the formal
arguments, which are quite standard (though we formally present in Section 5 the stability
notions for single-type distributions).
Recall that we restrict attention to distributions of types with finite support (both for
incumbents and for mutants), and thus we can apply the result by Nachbar (1990) that
any Lyapunov stable distribution is a Nash equilibrium. Thomas (1985) defines a notion of
an evolutionarily stable set and shows that it implies asymptotic stability in the replicator
dynamic in a finite strategy space (Cressman, 1997, extends this result to a large set of payoff-
monotone dynamics). Norman (2008, Theorem 1) extends this result to infinite strategy
spaces. Specifically, he shows that if the set of all distributions over a Borel set is evolutionary
stable with a uniform invasion barrier, then it is asymptotically stable.
Let ∆Γ ⊂ ∆ (T ) be the set of distributions over Γ (i.e, the distributions that assign
positive probability only to elements in Γ.) The fact that Γ is internally equivalent and
externally strict implies that ∆Γ is evolutionarily stable. It is also relatively straightforward
to see that the fully-cursed type (1, ψ∗1) ∈ Γ has a uniform invasion barrier (i.e., there is ¯ > 0
such that the incumbent type (1, ψ∗1) strictly outperforms any mutant type outside Γ with
mass 0 <  < ¯,) and that this invasion barrier also holds for any other distribution in ∆Γ.
Thus, one can adapt the result of Norman (2008) to the current setup and conclude that the
set of distributions with a support in Γ is asymptotically stable.22 This implies the following
corollary of Proposition 1 which characterizes stable distributions in the replicator dynamic.
Corollary 1. In game G0 with an underlying replicator dynamic, (1) A distribution of types
η is Lyapunov stable if and only if η ∈ ∆Γ, and (2) the set ∆Γ is a minimal asymptotically
stable set.
21Note that we only consider perturbations in which an incumbent population is invaded by a small group
of mutants (that is, we consider the variational norm when assessing relevant nearby perturbations; see, e.g.,
Bomze, 1990). We do not consider “continuous” perturbations in which a large group of incumbents slightly
change their types as in Eshel & Motro (1981). This is because: (1) a coordinated change in the type of many
incumbents seems less plausible in our setup; and (2) the existing results regarding “continuous” stability
(e.g., Oechssler & Riedel, 2002) hold only when the set of strategies is a subset of R, and an analysis with
the set of strategies in our population game is intractable.
22Norman (2008) formally deals with strategy spaces that are subsets of Rn, but it seems that all the
arguments in his proof can be extended to the current setup.
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4 Introducing Additional Activities
The main drawback of the analysis in the previous section is the assumption that fitness
is a result of a single-barter interaction. Obviously, agents engage in many activities that
determine their fitness, and it is reasonable to assume that in many of these activities only
one of the behavioral biases is relevant, and that it therefore imposes limitations on the
behavior of the biased agent. For example, if a non-rational agent also trades with goods of
publicly observable quality or simply private value, then cursedness will not be relevant, and
the endowment effect will result in an average loss. In what follows we allow agents to engage
in additional activities, and assume that in such activities biases are harmful. In this section
we show that in such a case the rational type has an advantage over all the other types,
including those in Γ. In the next section we show that with some plausible assumptions on
the dynamics, biased types can be stable.
We model additional activities as follows. With some probability p agents take part in
other activities, in which biases are detrimental. Formally, for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, agents play a
population game Gp = (T, up) with a payoff function up : T ×∆ (T )→ [L,H] defined as
up (t, η) = (1− p) · u (t, η) + p · v (t, η) , (3)
where v (t, η), the payoff in other activities, is bias-monotone: larger biases yield lower
payoffs. Formally, for every (χ, ψ) , (χ′, ψ′) ∈ T and η ∈ ∆ (T ):
χ < χ′ and ψ ≺ ψ′ ⇒ v ((χ′, ψ′) , η) < v ((χ, ψ) , η) .
In addition, we assume that v (t, η) is Lipschitz-continuous.23
By definition, in any game Gp the rational type (I, 0) has maximal v. In the previous
section we have shown that in G0 there are types that behave as if they were rational in some
configurations, but clearly this cannot be the case when p > 0. In such a case, the rational
type will always have an advantage. Therefore, extending Definition 3 to any population
game, the only Nash equilibrium of Gp (for p > 0) is a population of unbiased agents, and,
moreover, it is a strict equilibrium.
Proposition 2 (Unique Equilibrium in GP ). Type (0, I) is the unique Nash equilibrium for
every p > 0. Moreover, it is a strict equilibrium.
23Formally, there exists K ∈ N such that for every t, t′ ∈ T and η ∈ ∆ (T ): v (t′, η)− v (t, η) ≤ K · ‖t′ − t‖ ,
where ‖t′ − t‖ = ‖(χ′, ψ′)− (χ, ψ)‖ = |χ′ − χ| + ||ψ′ − ψ|| is the distance between types and ‖ψ′ − ψ‖ =´H
x=L |ψ′ (x)− ψ (x)| dx is the distance between perception biases.
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As in the discussion that follows Proposition 1, we can adapt existing results from the
literature (when restricting attention to the variational norm) to show that, if the population
evolves according to the replicator dynamic, then eventually the rational type will be the
only one that survives.
Corollary 2. In Gp with p > 0 and an underlying replicator dynamic, type (0, I) is asymp-
totically stable. Moreover, no other distribution of types is Lyapunov-stable.
The above corollary shows that when one focuses on the replicator dynamic, the results
of Section 3 are not robust to the introduction of additional activities. As soon as additional
activities are introduced, even when they are infrequent (i.e., with a low probability), only
the rational type (0, I) is stable.
5 Preservation of Biases with Additional Activities
In this section we show that if one is willing to consider a broader family of evolutionary
dynamics, then our results that biased types are stable continue to hold even when additional
activities are present. In Section 5.1 we present and motivate a family of hybrid-replicator
dynamics. This family extends the well-known replicator dynamic by allowing new agents
to replicate each trait from a different incumbent. Then, in Section 5.2, we demonstrate
why heterogeneous populations are unstable in our framework. This allows us to focus in
Section 5.3 on the stability of homogeneous populations (i.e., types). We show that types in
Γ are stable also when p > 0 if the underlying dynamic belongs to this family (except in the
extreme case of the replicator dynamic). Proposition 3 shows that the population converges
to Γ from any initial state. Proposition 4 shows that the population will stay in this type
for a relatively long time, since this type is stable against an invasion of mutants as long as
they are not very close. Thus, although the population moves toward (I, 0), it does so in a
long series of mutations that have a low probability to occurrence.
5.1 Hybrid-Replicator Dynamics
We model the evolutionary selection process in discrete time with each time period τ =
0, 1, 2, .. representing a generation.24 The dynamics are represented by a deterministic tran-
sition function g : ∆ (T )→ ∆ (T ) describing the distribution of types in the next generation
as a function of the distribution in the previous generation. The family of hybrid-replicator
24Similar results can also be obtained also with a selection process in continuous time.
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dynamics is characterized by a recombination rate r ∈ [0, 1] that describes the probability
that each offspring is randomly assigned to two incumbent agents (“parents”) and copies a
single trait from each one of them; under the complementary probability each offspring is
assigned to a single incumbent and copies both of its traits. As in the case of the replicator
dynamic, all these random assignments are distributed according to the incumbents’ fitness.
Below we provide a semi-formal description of the transition function. The formal definitions
appear in Appendix A.5.
As is common in the literature, we assume that the expected number of offspring of each
agent is equal to his game payoff plus a positive constant that reflects background factors
that are unrelated to the game. Let fη (t) ∈ R+ be the relative fitness of type t in population
η ∈ ∆ (T ), that is, this agent’s fitness divided by the average fitness in the population.
Denote by η (χ) and η (ψ) the total frequency of types in η with cursedness level χ ∈ [0, 1]
and perception bias ψ ∈ Ψ, respectively. Now, let fη (χ) and fη (ψ) be the expected relative
fitness of types in η with cursedness level χ and perception bias ψ, respectively. The transition
function is defined as follows:
g (η) ((χ, ψ)) = (1− r) · η ((χ, ψ)) · fη ((χ, ψ)) + r · η (χ) · fη (χ) · η (ψ) · fη (ψ) . (4)
The family of hybrid-replicator dynamics extends the standard replicator dynamic (Tay-
lor & Jonker, 1978; reformulated in Weibull, 1997, Chapter 4.1) for which g (η) ((χ, ψ)) =
η ((χ, ψ)) ·fη ((χ, ψ)) . Observe that a hybrid-replicator dynamic coincides with the replicator
dynamic if either r = 0 or one of the biases has the same level in the entire population.25
One interpretation of the hybrid-replicator dynamics is biological heredity. If one assumes
that each trait (cursedness and perception bias) is controlled by a different locus (position in
the DNA sequence), then the probability that each child inherits each trait from a different
parent is equal to the biological recombination rate between these loci. This parameter is
equal to 0.5 if the two loci are on two different chromosomes, and it is strictly between 0 and
0.5 if the two loci are in different locations in the same chromosome. A hybrid-replicator
dynamic is an exact description of a selection process in a haploid population in which each
individual carries one copy of each chromosome, and it is a stylized description that captures
the important relevant properties of a selection process in a diploid population, like the
human population, in which each individual carries two copies of each chromosome (see, e.g.,
25If all types have the same cursedness, χ, then η (χ) = 1, η (ψ) = η ((χ, ψ)), fη (χ) = 1, and fη (ψ) =
fη ((χ, ψ)), which implies that this dynamic coincides with the replicator dynamic. The same happens when
there is a single ψ.
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Maynard Smith 1971 and Nowak et al. 1997 for examples of using stylized models of haploid
populations when analyzing biological evolutionary processes in humans). One can show that
the hybrid-replicator dynamics have the same implications for asymptotic stability as a more
detailed description of diploid populations.26
An additional interpretation is that of a social learning process. The parameter r de-
termines the frequency of new agents that independently choose two “mentors” and imitate
a single trait from each; each of the remaining new agents chooses a single “mentor” and
imitates both his traits. In both cases, the probability of choosing a specific agent as a men-
tor is proportional to that agent’s fitness. The standard implicit assumption in models of
social learning in the economic literature is that agents always imitate a single “mentor” (see,
Weibull, 1997, and the references there). However, if mentors are characterized by several
separate observable traits that may be observed in different domains, it seems plausible that
new agents may combine different traits from different mentors.
5.2 Instability of Heterogeneous Populations
In order to facilitate the formal analysis presented in Section 5.3, we focus on studying the
stability of homogenous populations that include a single incumbent type against the invasion
of a single mutant type, rather than studying the stability of heterogeneous distributions
against an invasion of heterogeneous groups of mutant types. The restriction to a single
mutant type reflects the assumption that mutants are rare; it can be relaxed without affecting
the results (but it makes for more cumbersome notation and definitions). The restriction
to a single incumbent type is explained in this section where we informally sketch why
heterogeneous populations are not stable in our setup.
We begin by demonstrating why a heterogeneous distribution that includes two types in
Γ is unstable. Observe that the support of a fixed point of a hybrid-replicator dynamic (with
r > 0) must be a product set (i.e., Xη × Ψη). Let η be a distribution with a support that
includes two types in Γ (t and t′) and the two hybrid types that combine a trait from each
of these types: {
t =
(
χ, ψ∗χ
)
, t′ =
(
χ′, ψ∗χ′
)
,
(
χ, ψ∗χ′
)
,
(
χ′, ψ∗χ
)}
.
For simplicity, assume that η is symmetric: η (t) = η (t′), and η
((
χ, ψ∗χ′
))
= η
((
χ′, ψ∗χ
))
,
and denote χ¯ = 0.5 · (χ+ χ′). Distribution η is not stable against an external mutant with
26In particular, assuming that each trait is influenced by a different chromosome and that the “mutant”
type can be “dominant” in both loci yields r = 0.5. Other plausible assumptions (e.g., “recessive” mutants,
and the two loci being in different parts of the same chromosome) yield a value strictly between 0 and 0.5.
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type t¯ =
(
χ¯, ψ∗χ¯
)
for low p′s because: (1) type t¯ has approximately the same fitness as types
t and t′, and (2) the hybrid types that share one of the traits of the mutant type t¯,
(
χ¯, ψ∗χ
)
,(
χ¯, ψ∗χ′
)
,
(
χ, ψ∗χ¯
)
, and
(
χ′, ψ∗χ¯
)
, are substantially closer to Γ than are the hybrid incumbent
types
(
χ, ψ∗χ′
)
and
(
χ′, ψ∗χ
)
. Thus they achieve higher payoff in the barter trade. This implies
that χ¯ and ψ¯ have higher average fitness than the other biases (i.e., fη (χ¯) > fη (χ) , fη (χ′)
and fη
(
ψ¯
)
> fη (ψ) , fη (ψ′)). By (4), a hybrid-replicator dynamic implies that mutant t¯
succeeds in invading the population (his fitness is as high as that of the the incumbents, and
the fitness of each of his traits is strictly higher than that of the incumbents’ traits).
This argument can be extended to general heterogeneous distributions. Observe that the
payoff of the barter trade is strictly concave in a trader’s thresholds (see part 2 in the proof of
Proposition 1, and assume trade occurs with positive probability). In addition, the thresholds
of the traders are strictly increasing (decreasing) in the cursedness level (perception bias).
These two observations imply that “intermediate” types use intermediate thresholds; that
is, if each bias of type t is a mixed average of the respective biases of types t1 and t2, then
its threshold strategy is strictly between the threshold strategies of types t1 and t2. If a
heterogeneous population, η, is a fixed point of the dynamic, then different types must use
different thresholds (because the support of the population is a product set, and two types
that differ in only one of the traits must have different threshold strategies). Intuitively, due
to these observations, there is a “mean” type t¯ with biases that are weighted averages of the
incumbents’ biases, such that it uses thresholds that are weighted averages of the incumbents’
thresholds, and a similar property holds for his “hybrid” offspring. (The explicit expression
of t¯ involves technical difficulties and this is why we only sketch an intuitive argument.)
Finally, due to strict concavity, mutant agents with type t¯ and their “hybrid” offspring would
achieve, on average, strictly higher payoffs in the barter trade relative to the incumbents. For
a sufficiently low p, this implies that such mutants could successfully invade the population.
5.3 Stability of Types
In this section we analyze the stability of types given an underlying hybrid-replicator dynamic,
which is perturbed by allowing at each generation a small probability that a small mass of
“mutant” types invades the population.
Our first result shows global convergence to Γ from any initial type. Any type t = (χ, ψ)
outside Γ, provided that p is sufficiently low, will be eliminated by any mutant with the
same cursedness level as t and a perception bias strictly closer to Γ but not too far from
ψ. Formally, let gτ (η) be the induced distribution of type τ generations after an initial
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distribution η (i.e, g2 (η) = g (g (η)), etc.).
Definition 5. Type t′ ∈ T eliminates t ∈ T if for any  ∈ (0, 1): limτ→∞gτ ( · t′ + (1− ) · t) =
t′.
Proposition 3 (Convergence towards Γ). For every type t = (χ, ψ) ∈ T\Γ there exists
p¯, β¯ > 0 such that for 0 ≤ p ≤ p¯ and 0 < β ≤ β¯, type tβ =
(
χ, β · ψ∗χ + (1− β) · ψ
)
eliminates type t.
The sketch of the proof is as follows. For each surplus coefficient α, the unique optimal
threshold is α·µα. Due to Proposition 1, the fact that ψ 6= ψ∗χ implies that there is an interval
of α′s for which type t uses suboptimal thresholds. Moreover, one can show that for each α
for which type t uses a too low (high) threshold, type
(
χ, ψ∗χ
)
uses a too high (low) threshold.
Thus, for a sufficiently low β, the mixed perception bias β ·ψ∗χ+(1− β) ·ψ induces thresholds
that are strictly between type t’s thresholds and the optimal thresholds. This implies that
type tβ achieves a strictly higher payoff against type t, and against any mixed population
of these two types. Finally, since hybrid-replicator dynamics are payoff-monotone when all
types share the same cursedness level, type tβ eliminates type t.
Given Proposition 3, we can expect that any population outside Γ will converge to Γ in
several steps. Our second result shows that all types in Γ are stable in the following sense:
for each incumbent type t ∈ Γ and mutant type t′ ∈ T , if p is sufficiently small then after
a small invasion of mutants the population never moves far away from its pre-entry state t,
and it converges back to the pre-entry state in the long run. Formally:
Definition 6. Type t ∈ T is asymptotically stable against type t′ ∈ T if for every λ ∈ (0, 1)
there exists  such that for every ′ ∈ (0, ):
1. (Lyapunov stability) gτ (′ · t′ + (1− ′) · t) (t) > 1− λ for every τ ∈ N; and
2. limτ→∞gτ (′ · t′ + (1− ′) · t) = t.
Otherwise, we say that type t is asymptotically unstable against t′.
Proposition 4 (Stability of Γ). Assume that r > 0 and let t ∈ Γ and t′ ∈ T where t 6= t′.
Then, there exists p¯ > 0 such that for every p ≤ p¯, type t is asymptotically stable against
type t′.
The sketch of the proof is as follows. First, we adapt a related result of Waldman (1994),
and show that type t is asymptotically stable against type t′ if the fitness of type t′ is not
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more than 11−r times the fitness of type t, and in addition the fitness of the hybrid types
that share one trait of t and one trait of t′ is lower than the fitness of t. The intuition for
this is that as long as type t′ and the hybrid types are rare, then at each generation the
frequency of offspring of type t′ is approximately (1− r) times its relative fitness, while its
remaining offspring are hybrid (i.e., share one of its traits). Thus, if (1− r) times the fitness
of t′ and the fitness of each hybrid type is smaller than the fitness of t, then the frequency of
all types other than type t converges to 0. Then we observe that Proposition 1 implies that
type t best-replies to itself, and that any type that shares one of the traits with t achieves a
strictly smaller payoff against type t. Combining the lemma and the observation immediately
completes the proof.
An important feature of hybrid-replicator dynamics (for r > 0) is that in these dynamics
the rational type (0, I) does not eliminate all other types when p > 0. A simple adaptation
of the proof of Proposition 4 yields the following:
Corollary 3 (Rational Type Cannot Enter Population). Any type that is sufficiently close
to Γ and sufficiently far from (0, I) is asymptotically stable against (0, I) for a sufficiently
small p > 0.
The reason for this is that while type (0, I) strictly outperforms the incumbent type, its
relative fitness is less than 11−r (assuming the incumbent type is sufficiently close to Γ and
p > 0 is sufficiently small), and the hybrid types that have one unbiased trait are strictly
outperformed by the incumbent type that has two biases that partially compensate for each
other.
Note that parameter p¯ in Proposition 4 depends on t and t′, and converges to 0 when
t′ → t. When p is small but positive, type t ∈ Γ is asymptotically stable against all mutant
types except those that are very close to t and have slightly smaller biases (such a close
mutant, t′, can invade because it obtains almost the same payoff in the barter interaction
and a strictly higher payoff in the non-barter activity). By continuity, a similar property
holds for incumbent types that are very close to Γ. In other words, a type t that is close
to Γ may be invaded by some other type t′ only if the latter type is close both to Γ and
to t. Due to the Lipschitz continuity of v, one can show that each small neighborhood of
Γ is an asymptotically stable set for a sufficiently small p > 0, and that each type in this
neighborhood is asymptotically unstable only against other types that are very close.
Proposition 4 shows that a biased type close enough to Γ can survive as a unique incum-
bent type for a long time (that is, in the “long run”). Only the rational type, however, is
asymptotically stable against all types, and therefore if we wait long enough the population
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will eventually be composed of that type (that is, the rational type is the only one stable in
the “ultra-long run”). The latter implication is a result of the continuity of types: for each
p > 0 there exists a sufficiently close type that can invade the population. Restricting the set
of feasible types to a large finite set (as in Waldman, 1994) would yield asymptotic stability
of each type that is close enough to Γ (i.e., there exists p¯ > 0 such that for every p < p¯, each
feasible type close enough to Γ is stable against all feasible types).
6 Discussion
6.1 Random Traits and Empirical Prediction
For simplicity, we have described agents with a particular type as having the same cursedness
level and the same perception bias. However, as is standard in the evolutionary literature,
the results remain qualitatively the same if the biases are only partially heritable; that is, if
cursedness and perception bias that an agent of type (χ, ψ) exhibits are χ + χ and ψ + ψ,
respectively, where χ and ψ are random “noise” factors unrelated to the agent’s type.
Combining this interpretation of our model with the instability of a heterogeneous distri-
bution of types (Section 5.2) yields the following empirical prediction. In a specific society
that shares the same evolutionary history, agents are expected to have on average a positive
cursedness level and a positive endowment effect, and these traits should be uncorrelated
(as society should be concentrated around a single type in Γ, and the heterogeneity reflects
random type-unrelated “noise”). If one can compare different societies that have indepen-
dent evolutionary histories, then these societies are expected to be at different states in Γ,
and therefore one expects a strong positive correlation between the average cursedness and
the average endowment effect across societies. We are unaware of any existing experimental
evidence that can either validate or falsify this prediction.
6.2 Richer Environments
The model described in Section 4 (with slight modifications) can capture an environment
in which agents randomly engage in one of many barter-trade interactions. Specifically, our
stability results in Section 5 can be adapted to hold also when in each period players interact
in a slightly different barter-trade interaction (rather than playing the same game with high
probability while engaging in a completely different activity with some low probability, as in
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the model above).27
For concreteness, consider the following example. Assume that each period traders’ pri-
vate signals are drawn from a different distribution. The distribution is chosen i.i.d. each
period according to a normal random variable νσ ∼ N (0, σ2). Given νσ, the private value
of each trader is distributed according to the CDF Fνσ (x) =
(
x−L
H−L
)exp(νσ). Both agents
publicly observe the realization of νσ before they decide whether or not to trade (the case
in which νσ is unobserved by the traders is equivalent to playing a fixed barter trade). This
environment can be embedded in our model. Let the function u be defined as the payoff
function in the barter trade with the distribution of private signals F0 (x), and the function
v (σ) be defined as the expected difference between the payoff in the game with distribution
Fνσ (x) and the payoff in the game F0 (x) (where the expectation is taken with respect to
νσ). Now let uσ = u + v (σ) be the expected payoff in such an environment. Note that the
standard deviation σ replaces p as the magnitude of the perturbation in the model. Observe
that: (1) the function uσ (t, η) describes the expected payoff of type t in population η in
this environment; (2) v (σ) ∼ O (σ) for a sufficiently small σ; and (3) function v (σ) (t, η) is
Lipschitz continuous and bias-monotone. Due to these observations, all our stability results
(Propositions 2-4) can be extended to this setup in a relatively straightforward way when σ
is sufficiently small. This example can be generalized to any family of ex-ante distributions
of private values, as long as the variance among these distributions is sufficiently small.
6.3 Different Ways to Capture the Biases
Our qualitative results are robust to the exact way in which the two biases are captured
in the model. One can capture cursedness by following a different approach than Eyster
& Rabin (2005) (e.g., by adopting the Analogy Based Expectation Equilibrium approach,
as in Jehiel & Koessler, 2008). Since we allow a large set of perception bias functions,
we can still find a set of types for which the biases fully compensate each other also for
that alternative representation of cursedness. One can claim that not every perception bias
function is plausible, because biased individuals behave in a “simple” manner (for example,
one can claim that ψ’s must be linear). However, even for a large class of restricted sets of
perception bias function, where the two biases cannot fully compensate for each other, the
results of Section 5 continue to hold. This is due to the fact that under the hybrid replicator
dynamic biases survive in the long run even if they only approximately compensate for each
27The results can also be adapted to a setup in which both kinds of perturbations are present: players play
with high probability a barter-trade game, but this game may be slightly-different each time, and with some
small probability they engage in a completely different interaction.
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other.
6.4 Different Barter-Trade Mechanisms
Our results remain qualitatively similar to other variants of barter with indivisible goods,
such as having interdependent values instead of common values, or having a different surplus
coefficient for each trader. One can also consider trade with divisible goods in which the
relative price of exchange between the commodities is endogenously determined by haggling.
Such trading mechanisms turn out to be analytically intractable (though numeric analysis
suggests that similar results may hold in such a setup). The analysis can be rendered tractable
by assuming that the price is determined by a noisy double auction: if the buyer’s price is
lower than the seller’s price no trade occurs, while if it is higher then the probability of trade
is increasing linearly in the difference between the two bids, and the price is the mean of the
two bids. In this specific setup the results remain qualitatively similar.
A Technical Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1 (Existence of Equilibrium Configurations)
Denote by F the absolutely continuous cumulative distribution function of xi. The explicit
formula for the expected value of the partner’s good conditional on his agreement to trade ,
µα (η, b), is
µα (η, b) =
∑
t∈supp(η) η (t) · F (b (t) (α)) · µ≤b(t)(α)∑
t∈supp(η) η (t) · F (b (t) (α))
, (5)
and if the denominator equals 0 (i.e., no agent ever agrees to trade given coefficient α), let
µα (η, β) = L.
Let {ti = (χi, ψi)}i≤n be the finite set of types in population η (n is the arbitrary number
of types). Substituting (5) in (1), configuration (η, b) is an equilibrium if and only if for each
α ∈
[
1, H
L
]
and for each type i ≤ n:
ψ (b (ti) (α)) = α ·
(
χi · µ+ (1− χi) ·
∑
j≤n η (tj) · F (b (tj) (α)) · µ≤b(tj)(α)∑
j≤n η (tj) · F (b (tj) (α))
)
. (6)
Fix any α ∈
[
1, H
L
]
. Let xi = b (ti) (α) and ηi = η (ti). Then (6) is reduced to the following
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set of n equations:
∀i ≤ n ψ (xi) = α
(
χi · µ+ (1− χi) ·
∑
j≤n ηj · F (xj) · µ≤xj∑
j≤n ηj · F (xj)
)
. (7)
For each i ≤ n, let gi,α : [L, µ]→ [L, α · µ] be a function that assigns, for any expected value
of an object that is traded in the population v, the threshold of agent with type ti. Formally:
gi,α (v) = ψ−1 (α · (χi · µ+ (1− χi) · v)) . (8)
Notice that in equilibrium xi = b (ti) (α) = gi,α (µα (η, b)). Now let h : [L, α · µ]n → [L, µ] be
the function that assigns, to a profile of thresholds that are used in population η, (x1, ..., xn),
the expected value of an object that is traded in that population. Formally:
hη (x1, ..., xn) =
∑
j≤n ηj · F (xj) · µ≤xj∑
j≤n ηj · F (xj)
.
Notice that µα (η, b) = hη [b (t1) (α) , ..., b (tn) (α)]. Finally, let f : [L, µ] → [L, µ] be defined
as follows:
fα (v) = hη (g1,α (v) , ..., gn,α (v)) .
Observe that any solution to the equation v = fα (v) induces thresholds that can be used as
part of an equilibrium when the coefficient surplus is equal to α; that is, v = µα (η, b) and
b (ti) (α) = gi,α (v). We now show that there is at least one solution for v = fα(v). First
observe that since we assume that F and ψ are continuous functions then g, h, and f are
a continuous. Second, notice that for each α ∈
[
1, H
L
]
fα (L) ≥ L and fα (µ) ≤ µ. Thus
fα(v) = v at some v ∈ [L, µ].
Finally, we have to show that there exists a continuous function v∗ :
[
1, H
L
]
→ [L,H] such
that for each α ∈
[
1, H
L
]
fα(v∗ (α)) = v∗ (α).28 Let v∗ (α) be the largest fixed point of fα (i.e,
for each α v∗ (α) = arg maxv∈[1,HL ] fα(v) = v). The fact that ψ
−1 and h are continuous and
increasing functions and the linear dependency in α in (8) implies the continuity of v∗ (α)
with respect to α.
Note that the above v∗ (α) is the function that selects the equilibria with maximal trade.
All of our results remain the same if one chooses a different continuous function v∗ (α) , such
as the one that selects the smallest fixed point of fα (and minimizes the probability of trade).
28We have to show the continuity of v∗ (α) in order to have all types using a continuous threshold strategy
as a function of surplus coefficient (as assumed in the definition of a strategy in Section 2.3).
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A.2 Formal Definition of the Payoff Function of G0
In this section we explicitly state the payoff of each type in the population game G0. Let
u (s1, s2|α, x1, x2) be trader’s 1 payoff when his signal is x1 and he plays s1 while his partner,
trader 2, has a signal x2 and plays s2, and when the public signal is α:
u0 (s1, s2|α, x1, x2) =

α · x2 x1 ≤ s1 (α) and x2 ≤ s2 (α)
x1 else.
.
Now, let u (s1, s2) be the expected payoff of an agent with strategy s1 who faces a partner
with strategy s2, where the expectation is taken with respect to the values of of the signals
x1,x2 and α.
u (s1, s2) =
ˆ H/µ
α=1
ˆ H
x1=L
ˆ H
x2=L
u0 (s1, s2|α, x1, x2) dFx2 dFx1 dFα,
where Fj is the CDF of random variable i ∈ {α,x1,x2}. Finally, given type t ∈ T and an
equilibrium configuration (η, b∗(η)), define u (t, η) as the expected payoff of a type t ∈ T
agent who faces an opponent randomly selected from population η:
u (t, η) =
∑
t′∈supp(η)
η (t′) · u [s∗t (α) (η, b∗(η)) , b∗(η) (t′)] .
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1 (Characterization of Equilibria in G0)
Proof. The proof includes the following parts:
1. Definitions and notations:
(a) Probability of trade: let q (α|η) be the probability that a random partner from
population η agrees to trade given α. Note, that q (α|η) > 0 iff ∃t ∈ supp (η)
with b∗η (t) (α) > L.
(b) Expected payoff of a threshold: let u (x, α|η) be the expected payoff of a player
who uses threshold x ∈ [L,H], and faces a distribution of types η (which plays
according to b∗η) conditional on the coefficient beingα.
(c) Incumbents: Given a distribution of types η we shall call the types in supp (η) the
incumbents.
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(d) Type’s threshold strategy: for each type t = (χ, ψ) let strategy s∗t (α|η) be the
threshold strategy of type t who faces population η; that is, for each α ∈
[
1, H
L
]
s∗t (α|η) is the unique solution to the equation:
ψ (s∗t (α|η)) = α ·
(
χ · µ+ (1− χ) · µα
(
η, b∗η
))
.
(e) Mean threshold: For each α ∈
[
1, H
L
]
and distribution of types η ∈ ∆ (T ) ,let
x¯ (α|η) be the unique solution to the equation: µ≤x¯(α|η) = µα (η); that is, in an
homogenous population in which everyone uses threshold x¯ (α|η), the mean value
of a traded good is the same as in population η (given α).
2. The expected payoff of a threshold is given by the following formula:
u (x, α|η) = u (α · µα, α|η)−q (α|η)·|F (x)− F (α · µα)|·E (|y − α · µα| | y ∈ [α · µα, x]) ,
(9)
where, with slight abuse of notation, [α · µα, x] = [x, α · µα] if x < α · µα. The optimal
threshold, which induces the maximal payoff, is x = α ·µα because it results in trade iff
the trader’s good is worth less than the expected value of a trading partner. Using a dif-
ferent threshold x yields a wrong decision with probability q (α|η) · |F (x)− F (α · µα)|.
Conditional on making a wrong decision and the partner’s agreement to trade, the ex-
pected loss from trade is equal to E (|y − α · µα| | y ∈ [α · µα, x]) (as this the expected
difference between the value of the trader’s good and the conditional expected value
of his partner). Observe that u (x, α|η) is concave w.r.t. x, and strictly concave if
q (α|η) > 0.
3. The previous step immediately implies that type (0, I) (Which always choose the opti-
mal threshold of α · µα) weakly outperforms any other type (i.e., u ((0, I) , η) ≥ u (t, η)
for each t ∈ T and η ∈ ∆ (T )), and strictly outperforms if there is any α such that:
q (α|η) > 0 and x 6= α · µα.
4. The “if” side. Let η ∈ ∆ (T ) be a Nash equilibrium of G0. We prove that supp (η) ∈ Γ.
(a) In any Nash equilibrium all types use the optimal thresholds for all αs; that is,
∀t ∈ supp (η) and α ∈
[
1, H
L
]
b∗η (t) (α) = α · µα (η).
Assume in contrast that there is at least one value of α for which one of the
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incumbent types uses a non-optimal threshold. This set of α’s is defined as
Aα =
{
α | ∃t0 ∈ supp (η) s.t. b∗η (t0) (α) 6= α · µα (η)
}
.
From 3 and the continuity of the threshold strategies an incumbent type in a
Nash equilibrium distribution can use a non-optimal threshold in an α only if
q (α|η) = 0.
Let α¯ be the supremum of Aα. Consider first the case where α¯ = HL . In such a
case, the assumptions that each ψ is strictly increasing and ψ (H) ≤ H implies
that ψ (x) < H for each x < H, and therefore q (α|η) > 0 for α’s sufficiently close
to H
L
, and u ((0, I) , η) > u (t, η) for some type t ∈ supp (η).
Now consider the case where α¯ < H
L
. All types play the rational threshold for
α > α¯, and by continuity of b∗η (t) (α) all agents play the rational threshold at α¯.
Observe, that the rational thresholds are always strictly larger than L, and this
implies that q (α|η) > 0 for each α ≥ α¯. By continuity of b∗η (t) (α), there exist an
interval of αs such that: α < α¯, q (α|η) > 0 and α ∈ Aα, and this implies that η
cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
(b) If there exists t0 = (χ0, ψ0) ∈ T\Γ in supp (η) then there exists an α such that type
t0 does not use the optimal threshold: i.e., ∃α0 ∈
[
1, H
L
]
b∗η (t0) (α) 6= α · µα (η) .
Assume to the contrary that for each α ∈
[
1, H
L
]
, all incumbents t ∈ supp (η) use
the “optimal” threshold b∗η (t) (α) = x∗(α) ≡ α·µα. This implies that ∀α ∈
[
1, H
L
]
:
ψ0 (α · µα) = α · (χ0 · µ+ (1− χ0) · µα) .
The fact that all players use the optimal thresholds implies that µα = µ≤x∗(α), and
therefore x∗(1) = L and x∗
(
H
L
)
= H. By continuity, x∗ (α) obtains all values in
[L,H]. Given x∗(α) ≡ α · µα we can rewrite the indifference condition above as
follows: ∀x∗ ∈ [L,H],
ψ0 (x∗) = α ·
(
χ0 · µ+ (1− χ) · x
∗
α
)
= χ0 · µ
µ≤x∗
· x∗ + (1− χ) · x∗ = ψ∗χ0(x∗),
which implies that ψ0(x) = ψ∗χ0(x) – a contradiction to the assumption that t0 ∈
T\Γ.
5. The “only if” side and the “moreover” statement. Let η0 be a distribution with
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supp (η0) ∈ Γ. We prove that η0 is a Nash equilibrium, that all incumbents use
the same threshold strategy, and that each type t′ /∈ Γ is strictly out-performed (i.e,
u (t′, η) < u (t0, η) for each t0 ∈ supp (η0).
(a) In Section 3.1 we have shown that if all other agents use the “rational” threshold
that is defined by x∗(α) = α · µ<x∗(α), then a type t ∈ Γ also uses x∗(α). Thus,
b∗ = x∗(α) is an equilibrium behavior induced by distribution η0. In what follows
we show that there are no other equilibrium behaviors induced by distribution η0.
(b) Assume, in contrast, some other equilibrium behavior, that induces x¯ (α|η0) 6=
x∗(α)
i. If x¯ (α|η) > α · µα(η0) then s∗t (α|η0) < x¯ (α|η0) for each t =
(
χ, ψ∗χ
)
∈ Γ. To
see why recall that ψ∗χ is strictly increasing, and observe that s∗t (α|η0) is the
unique solution to the following equation:
ψ∗χ (s∗t (α|η0)) = α · (χ · µ+ (1− χ) · µα(η0))
< χ · µ
µ≤x¯(α|η0)
· x¯ (α|η0) + (1− χ) · x¯ (α|η0) = ψ∗χ (x¯ (α|η0)) ,
where the strict inequality is implied by x¯ (α|η0) > α · µα(η0) and µα(η0) =
µ≤x¯(α|η0). Since x¯ (α|η) is the average threshold used in the population, we get
a contradiction.
ii. By analogous argument, if x¯ (α|η0) < α · µα then s∗t (α|η0) > x¯ (α|η0) for each
t =
(
χ, ψ∗χ
)
∈ Γ, and we get again a contraction.
iii. Therefore, it must be that x¯ (α|η0) = α · µα. In such a case, by an analogous
argument, s∗t (α|η0) = x¯ (α|η0) = x∗(α) for each t =
(
χ, ψ∗χ
)
∈ Γ.
(c) The previous parts immediately imply that if supp (η0) ∈ Γ then all incumbent
types use threshold strategy x∗(α) and are internally-equivalent. Moreover, this
threshold strategy is the optimal one, and this implies that η0 is a Nash equilib-
rium.
(d) Finally, we can use a similar argument to 4b to show that for any α there is a
positive probability of trade, and therefore any type t′ /∈ Γ, that uses non-optimal
threshold for some α’s, has a strictly lower payoff compared to the incumbents
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 2 (Unique Equilibrium in GP)
Proof. Let t = (χ, ψ) ∈ T , t 6= (0, I). We have to show that up ((0, I) , (0, I)) > up (t, (0, I))
and up ((0, I) , t) > up (t, t).
1. Case I: t ∈ Γ\ (0, I). Observe this implies χ > 0 and ψ  I. Therefore v ((0, I) , η) >
v (t, η) for each η ∈ ∆ (T ). By part (3) of the proof of Prop. 1 u0 ((0, I) , η) ≥ u0 (t, η).
Thus, up ((0, I) , η) > up (t, η) for each η ∈ ∆ (T ). In particular, up ((0, I) , (0, I)) >
up (t, (0, I)) and up ((0, I) , t) > up (t, t).
2. Case II: t 6∈ Γ. By analogous arguments to part (4b) of the proof of Prop. 1
u0 ((0, I) , t) > u0 (t, t) and u0 ((0, I) , (0, I)) > u0 (t, (0, I)). The bias-monotonicity
assumption implies that v ((0, I) , (0, I)) ≥ v (t, (0, I)). These inequalities imply that
up ((0, I) , (0, I)) > up (t, (0, I)) and up ((0, I) , t) > up (t, t).
A.5 Formal Definition of the Hybrid-Replicator Dynamics
In this section we formalize the definition of the transition function g : ∆(T )→ ∆(T ) of the
distribution of types, which is described informally in Section 5.1. The relative fitness fη (t)
of type t in population η is
fη (t) =
φ+ up (t, η)
φ+ E (up (t, η))
= φ+ up (t, η)
φ+∑t′∈supp(η) η (t′) · up (t′, η) , (10)
where φ ≥ 0 is the background expected number of offspring for an individual (unrelated to
his payoff in the population game). Let Xη and Ψη be the cursedness levels and the perception
biases in population η:
Xη = {χ ∈ [0, 1] | ∃ψ ∈ Ψ s.t. (χ, ψ) ∈ supp (η)} ,
Ψη = {ψ ∈ Ψ | ∃χ ∈ [0, 1] s.t. (χ, ψ) ∈ supp (η)} .
For each χ ∈ Xη (ψ ∈ Ψη) define η (χ) (η (ψ)) as the total frequency of types with cursedness
level χ (perception bias ψ):
η (χ) =
∑
ψ∈	η
η ((χ, ψ))
η (ψ) = ∑
χ∈Xη
η ((χ, ψ))
 ,
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and define fη (χ) (fη (ψ)) as the mean relative fitness of types with cursedness level χ (per-
ception bias ψ):
fη (χ) = E (fη ((χ, ψ)) |ψ ∈ Ψη) =
∑
ψ∈	η
η ((χ, ψ))
η (χ) · fη ((χ, ψ))
f η (ψ) = E (fη ((χ, ψ)) |χ ∈ Xη) = ∑
χ∈Xη
η ((χ, ψ))
η (ψ) · fη ((χ, ψ))
 .
Lastly, the transition function is (for every (χ, ψ) ∈ Xη ×Ψη)
g (η) ((χ, ψ)) = (1− r) · η ((χ, ψ)) · fη ((χ, ψ)) + r · η (χ) · fη (χ) · η (ψ) · fη (ψ) .
A.6 Proof of Proposition 3 (Convergence Towards Γ)
Proof. The proof uses definitions and notations that were introduced in the proof of Prop.
1. Assume an homogenous population η = t = (χ, ψ) where t is an arbitrary type. Define
tΓ ≡
(
χ, ψ∗χ
)
as the type in Γ with the same cursedness as t.
1. By an analogous argument to part 4 of the proof of Prop. 1, there is an interval of α’s
such that: (1) type t induces trade with positive probability (i.e., q (α|t) > 0); and (2)
types t and tΓ use different thresholds (i.e, s∗t (α|η) 6= s∗tΓ (α|η).
2. The optimal threshold is between the thresholds induced by types t and tΓ: for each
α ∈
[
1, H
L
]
, either s∗tΓ (α|t) < α · µα < s∗t (α|t) or s∗t (α|t) < α · µα < s∗tΓ (α|t).
Assume without loss of generality that s∗t (α|t) > α · µα(the proof is analogous in the
opposite case). We have to show that type tΓ does not want to trade if he has an object
with value α · µα. Using (1), (2) and the monotonicity of ψ∗χ we write
ψ∗χ (α · µα)
?
> α · (χ · µ+ (1− χ) · µα)⇔
χ · µ
µ≤α·µα
· α · µα + (1− χ) · α · µα ?> α · χ · µ+ α · (1− χ) · µα ⇔ µα ?> µ≤α·µα ,
and the last inequality is satisfied since µα = µ≤s∗t (α|t) and s
∗
t (α|t) > α · µα.
3. By continuity, the previous step implies that there exists β¯ > 0 such that type tβ¯ =(
χ, β · ψ∗χ + (1− β) · ψ
)
induces threshold between t’s threshold and the optimal thresh-
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old. That is, for each α ∈
[
1, H
L
]
with x (t, α|t) 6= α · µα either x (t, α|t) < x (tβ, α|t) <
α · µα or x (t, α|t) > x (tβ, α|t) > α · µα. Note that u
(
tβ¯, t
)
> u (t, t).
4. By continuity, there exist p¯ > 0 such that for each 0 ≤ p ≤ p¯ and 0 < β < β¯, type
tβ =
(
χ, β · ψ∗χ + (1− β) · ψ
)
satisfies up (tβ, t) > up (t, t).
5. Observe, that all the above arguments work also in an heterogeneous population that
includes a mixture of types t and tβ. That is, for each γ ∈ (0, 1),
up (tβ, γ · t+ (1− γ) · tβ) > up (t, γ · t+ (1− γ) · tβ) .
As noted in Section 5.1, any hybrid-replicator dynamic coincides with the replicator
dynamic when all types share the same cursedness. This implies that type tβ eliminates
type t because it always achieves a strictly higher payoff.
A.7 Stability in Hybrid-Replicator Dynamics and Prop. 4’s Proof
In what follows, we first prove a lemma that characterizes stability in hybrid-replicator dy-
namics. The lemma shows that an incumbent type is asymptotically stable against a mutant
type if: (1) the mutant’s payoff is not substantially higher than incumbent’s payoff (specifi-
cally, the mutant’s fitness should be less than 11−r times the incumbent’s fitness); and (2) the
hybrid types (who have one trait from type t and one trait from type t′) yield lower payoffs
than the incumbent. We then use this lemma to prove Proposition 4 that deals with stability
of types in Γ. The lemma is a simple adaptation of Prop. 2 of Waldman (1994) that deals
with sexual reproduction (see also the related analysis in Eshel & Feldman 1984; Matessi &
Di Pasquale 1996).
Lemma 2 (Characterization of Stability in the Hybrid-Replicator Dynamics). Let t1 =
(χ1, ψ1) and t2 = (χ2, ψ2) denote some arbitrary types. Assume a population game Gp with a
hybrid-replicator dynamic with parameters φ and r, and let up(t, η) and fη(t) be the expected
payoff and relative fitness of type t against population η as defined in (3) and (10).
1. If (1− r) · ft1 (t2) > 1, then type t1 is asymptotically unstable against t2.
2. If up ((χ2, ψ1) , t1) > up (t1, t1), then type t1 is asymptotically unstable against (χ2, ψ1).
3. If up ((χ1, ψ2) , t1) > up (t1, t1), then type t1 is asymptotically unstable against (χ1, ψ2).
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4. If (a) (1− r)·ft1 (t2) < ft1 (t1), (b) up ((χ2, ψ1) , t1) < up (t1, t1), and (b) up ((χ1, ψ2) , t) <
up (t1, t1), then type t1 is asymptotically stable against t2.
Proof. Let  > 0 be sufficiently small, and let the initial distribution be: η0 = (1− )·t1+·t2.
Part (1). Assume that (1− r) ·ft1 (t2) = c > 1. By neglecting components that are O (2),
Eq. (4) implies that gτ (η0) (t2) ≈  · ((1− r) · ft1 (t2))τ =  · cτ and this implies instability of
t1 against t2.
Parts (2)-(3) are immediately implied by well-known results for the replicator dynamic
and the observation that when the population includes a single cursedness level (or a single
perception bias), then the hybrid-replicator dynamic coincides with a replicator dynamic.
Part (4). Assume inequalities (a)-(c). Inequalities (b) and (c) imply ft1 ((χ2, ψ1)) < 1
and ft1 ((χ1, ψ2)) < 1. Define a constant c such that
max {(1− r) · ft1 (t2) , ft1 ((χ2, ψ1)) , ft1 ((χ1, ψ2))} < c < 1.
Let ητ = gτ (η0) be the distribution after τ generations. By neglecting components that are
O (2), Eq. (4) implies that for every τ in which ητ ((χ1, ψ2)) and ητ ((χ2, ψ1)) are O ():
ητ (t2) ≈  · cτ which converges to 0 at an exponential rate. Assume to the contrary, that
ητ ((χ1, ψ2)) does not converge to zero at an exponential rate. Then, for a sufficiently large
τ , ητ (t2) << ητ ((χ1, ψ2)). In addition fητ (ψ2) ≈ fητ ((χ1, ψ2)) where fητ (ψ2) is the average
relative fitness of all types with ψ = ψ2 (defined in Section A.5) – fητ (ψ2) is a mixed average
of fητ ((χ1, ψ2)) and fητ (t2), and as the weight of the latter converges quickly to zero, the
average converges to the former. Let ′ = ητ ((χ1, ψ2)). By neglecting components that are
O (′2), Eq. (4) implies that:
ητ+1 ((χ1, ψ2)) ≈ (1− r) · ′ · fητ ((χ1, ψ2)) + r · ′ · fητ (ψ2) ≈ ′ · fητ ((χ1, ψ2)) < ′ · c
which implies that ητ ((χ1, ψ2)) converges to zero at an exponential rate. An analogous
arguments works for (χ2, ψ1).
A.7.1 Proof of Proposition 4 (Stability of Types in Γ)
Proof. Let the incumbent type be t =
(
χ, ψ∗χ
)
∈ Γ and let the mutant type be t′ = (χ′, ψ′). By
Proposition 1, in G0 type t ∈ Γ plays optimally against itself and any type outside Γ achieves
a strictly smaller payoff against type t. That is, u (t′, t) ≤ u (t, t) with strict inequality if
t′ /∈ Γ. Observe that (χ, ψ′) ,
(
χ′, ψ∗χ
)
/∈ Γ because each pair of types in Γ differ in both traits.
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These observations imply that for each δ > 0 there exists p¯ > 0 such that for each p ≤ p¯:
(1) up (t′, t) < up (t, t) + δ, (2) up ((χ, ψ′) , t) < up (t, t), and (3) up ((χ′, ψ) , t) < up (t, t).
Notice that δ can be chosen to be sufficiently small so that the first inequality will imply
(1− r) ·ft (t′) < 1. By Lemma 2, these inequalities imply that type t is asymptotically stable
against t′.
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